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 Abstract: The aim of this article is to analyse the length of custodial sentences for 
white-collar crimes in the context of Polish criminal policy. The analyses, based on the new 
and original data set obtained from case files, showed the non-linear dependency between the 
custodial sentence and the damage caused by a given fraud. From the perspective of the 
criminal law and economics, such a non-linearity may generate incentives for committing 
frauds on a bigger scale, because as the scale increases the relative severity of punishment 
decreases. Moreover, the gender bias in sentencing for the white-collar crimes in Poland was 
proven and in such cases women not only did receive lower custodial sentences, but also 
those ruled by female judges were lower. 
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 The aim of this academic paper is to outline a potential ineffectiveness in Polish 
criminal policy caused by the existing non-linearity between the custodial sentence and the 
damage caused by the crime. One can notice flattening (concavity of a function) of penalties 
for frauds, because above a certain threshold, imprisonment penalties are only slightly 
dependent on the sum for which the convict has scammed his or her victims. Such a state of 
affairs raises important questions about the effectiveness of Polish criminal policy, because a 
lack of a close dependence between the penalty for a crime and the sum involved in the crime 
may generate stronger incentives to commit white-collar crimes involving high amounts of 
money. Inability to deter from committing a fraud may lead to an increase in the supply of 
crimes and in effect increase the severity of social harms caused by them. Such a relationship 
is grounded in the theory of economic analysis of law, where an agent decides to misbehave 
on the basis of the profit and loss account. 
This article contributes to the literature, as it is one of the first empirical works in the 
scope of criminal law and economics which examines the dependence between the sum 
involved in a crime and the length of the sentence. A new and original dataset from court case 
files in Poland which were concluded with an imprisonment sentence for a fraud has been 
used. It has been demonstrated that courts issue relatively lenient sentences for financial 
frauds, and that there is a gender bias in sentencing. 
 
1. Literature review and institutional background 
 
Criminal law has been studied by economists for decades. In the ground-breaking 
work of Becker (1968), a decision to commit a crime is deemed a rational decision made 
based on a subjective assessment of costs and benefits of committing a crime. The foremost 
cost of committing a crime is the possible penalty (usually imprisonment), while benefits 
mainly include cash obtained as a result of the criminal activity, such as theft or financial 
fraud. The model proposed by Becker was then developed in consecutive works in the scope 
of criminal law and economics (in the works of, among others, Ehrlich 1973, Posner 1985, 
Levitt, Miles 2006, Polinsky, Shavell 2007). One of the conclusions is the discovery of a link 
between the expected imprisonment penalty and the supply of crimes. If detectability of 
crimes is low or if courts pass lenient sentences, crime rates increase. 
Research also focuses on court decisions in terms of their bias and effect of 
characteristics of the accused on the sentence. Many works have demonstrated that the 
determinants of the length or degree of a sentence include the race of the accused (Alesina, La 
Ferrara 2014; Depew et al. 2017), their ethnicity (Gazal-Ayal, Sulitzeanu-Kenan 2010), sex of 
the accused (Steffensmeier, Demuth 2006), sex of the judge (Boyd, Epstein, Martin 2010) or 
age of the judge (Riger et al. 1995). In general, in the studies of the sentencing bias, three 
phenomena affecting the sentence can be distinguished: the judge effect, the court effect, and 
the accused effect (Johnson 2006). However, the literature lacks a study that would take into 
consideration the link between the sum involved in a crime and the length of the penalty.  
One of the special categories of crimes is the so-called white-collar crime, which 
includes financial crimes such as fraud and deception, accounting crimes, collusion, tax fraud, 
credit fraud, and others. All those crimes are characterised by a lack of use of violence and a 
high sum involved. Studies show that white-collar criminals usually have a higher education 
degree, earn well, and enjoy a high social status (Benson, Moore 1992). White-collar 
criminals tend to have a broad understanding of law and tend to plan their frauds in advance. 
Moreover, they tend to have a consistent line of defence and rarely leave proofs of committed 
crimes. Altogether, such tendencies in a criminal’s behaviour make it difficult to accuse them 
(Podgor 2007; Gottschalk 2014). The white-collar crimes suit well the theory of economic 
analysis of law cited above. Firstly, they are well prepared and planned in advance. Secondly, 
in their case the profit and loss account is easy to be done. So far, there have been few 
quantitative studies concerning the length of sentences for white-collar crimes, the main 
obstacle being a lack of data. The few studies include the works of Wheeler et al. (1982), 
Gottschalk (2011) and Bhattacharya, Marshall (2012). 
This study uses a new and original dataset based on data obtained from a review of 
court case files. Files of all court cases from all criminal divisions of the Regional Court in 
Warsaw have been used. The studied period covers fraud cases from the period 2011–2016 
concluded with a final conviction issued before the end of 2016. This study takes into 
consideration the original decisions of the Regional Court as well as decisions after 
consideration of potential appeals to the Court of Appeal and cassation to the Supreme Court. 
The study uses data from one Regional Court in order to avoid the above-mentioned court 
effect. A person convicted for fraud is defined as a person convicted under Art. 286 in 
conjunction with Art. 294 of the Polish Criminal Code. Article 286 paragraph 1 of the Polish 
Criminal Code exhausts the definition of fraud as white-collar crime. Its wording is as 
follows: 
 
Art. 286. § 1. Whoever, in order to gain a material profit, causes another person to 
dispose of their property or someone else's property in a disadvantageous manner by 
misleading such person or by exploiting an error or incapability to duly understand the 
venture being undertaken shall be punishable by imprisonment from 6 months to 8 years. 
 
The data has been obtained under consent of the president of the Regional Court in 
Warsaw for viewing court case files in the archive under the supervision of an employee of 
the court. The sample includes all 107 persons who were sentenced by a final decision in 79 
cases from the said period. All crimes were committed by persons residing in Warsaw. 
Sampling is one of exploring methods used for investigating sentencing decisions (Merall et 
al. 2010). The sample of 107 convicted persons may appear relatively small; however, access 
to court files is very difficult due to the protection of personal data and the presence of 
sensitive data; furthermore, court files in Poland are drawn up only in paper form. This makes 
the obtainment of data very cumbersome, if not impossible. One additional obstacle is the 
relatively small number of convictions for fraud under Art. 286 par. 1 of the Criminal Code, 
which forces the extension of the sample to a six-year period, from 2011 to 2016. In the 
studied period, there were no legal changes which would affect the manner of passing 
judgements and sentencing for fraud.  
Court cases from the sample in question are quite diverse, although they all feature a 
relatively high amount of cash involved in the crime. Approximately 33% of the accused were 
convicted for credit frauds committed against banks; ca. 16% for accounting frauds and 
embezzlement against their own company; 12% for frauds in real estate trading. There were 
also some cases concerning the scamming of own clients, public institutions or casinos, 
forging documents and credit cards, and many other crimes. All those offences can be 
described as white-collar crimes due to the lack of violence and high sums involved; 
furthermore, a vast majority of the accused had a higher education and a high social status (ca. 
15% of the accused were company owners or board members of large companies,  23% were 
lawyers, and 10% were CFOs or accountants). Despite the relatively high social status, the 
striking majority of defendants declared none or a little of wealth, that same holds for income 
(45% declared that they had no wealth, 65% declared that their income was lower than 2000 
PLN per month). The most probable reason for such declarations was an attempt to foil bailiff 
execution. 
It also needs to be noted that the aim of this article is not to assess the fairness of 
sentencing in legal, sociological and ethical aspect. The aim of this article is to show on the 
example of the Polish criminal system that the court judgments may generate incentives for 
committing frauds on the larger scale. Thus, the criminal policy might not fulfil its role in 
deterring the potential criminal.  
 
 
2. Model 
 
The model is structured as follows:  
 
 
 
where:  
 — years of imprisonment 
 — sum involved in the crime 
 model parameters 
 threshold value with an interaction variable 
 control variables 
residual 
 
Whereas  is a dummy variable, which assumes following values: 
 
 
 
The dependent variable in the study is the length of imprisonment to which the 
Regional Court sentenced the accused. The Polish penal system permits suspended 
imprisonment sentences. That is why in one of the equations of the model created as part of 
robustness check, the dependent variable is the length of a suspended imprisonment sentence. 
The subsequent robustness check equation contains potential changes to the sentence of the 
Regional Court made by the Court of Appeal (in 70 cases, the Court of Appeal upheld the 
decision, in 9 reduced the length of prison sentence, and it did not increase the sentence in any 
case). All those values are expressed in years. The use of the length of a sentence as a 
dependent variable is common in the literature (e.g. Wheeler et al. 1982). 
The independent variable is the sum involved in the crime. Those values have been 
obtained from court case files, as in each verdict the court precisely determined the sum of 
money involved in a given crime. Regional Courts in Poland handle fraud cases which 
involve sums of money exceeding PLN 0.2 m (ca. EUR 47,951 at the exchange rate as at the 
end of 2017). Therefore, the lowest possible value is PLN 0.2 m, and the largest possible 
value is PLN 178 m. In total, out of 107 convictions, 36 concerned frauds for sums exceeding 
PLN 1 m (ca. EUR 239,693 at the exchange rate as at the end of 2017).  
In order to demonstrate the non-linear dependence between the imprisonment sentence 
and the sum involved, an interaction variable has been created, assuming the value of the sum 
involved in a crime if it exceeds a certain threshold, and assuming 0 otherwise. Statistical 
significance of that interaction variable may indicate non-linearity, and the sign of the 
parameter may allow an assessment of its nature. The results contain estimations of the model 
parameter for three different thresholds.   
It needs to be noted that the maximum length of a sentence for that crime is 8 years, 
which a priori conditions the non-linearity. In practice, however, the maximum length of a 
sentence in the studied sample was 7 years, and the average length of imprisonment was ca. 
1.9 years. This indicates non-linearity of a different kind: one independent from the maximum 
sentence for the crime in question. 
 
 <Table 1> here  
 
For the purpose of improving the quality of the model, the study uses a battery of 
control dummy variables, such as the age of the convict, sex of the judge, fact of repeat 
offending, number of committed frauds, and the fact of having a public defender (i.e. a court-
appointed attorney at the expense of the state). In order to study the hypothesis about the 
significant effect of general prevention on the length of imprisonment penalty, police data 
concerning the number of frauds per a resident of Warsaw and data on detectability of 
fraudsters has been used. In order to verify the hypothesis about a possible gender bias in 
sentencing, all equations include three dummy variables whose value depends on the sex of 
the judge and of the accused person. The reference point is a situation where both the judge 
and the convict are men. In the sample, 107 sentences were issued by 31 judges — 15 women 
and 16 men. Among the convicts, there were 28 women and 79 men. Descriptive statistics are 
provided in Table 1, while the results of model estimation (with the use of OLS method) can 
be found in Table 2.  
 
<Table 2> here 
 
3. Results 
 
The results of model estimation indicate a strong dependence between the sum involved in 
a crime and the length of prison sentence for that crime. The statistical significance and the 
sign of parameters with interaction variables confirm the existence of non-linearity: from a 
certain sum involved in a fraud, the penalty ceases to increase. The results of the test of 
parameter equality with a variable describing the sum involved in a crime and an interaction 
variable allow a positive verification of the hypothesis of their equality. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that above a certain threshold the sum involved in a crime has no effect on the 
degree of penalty for that crime. The estimated parameters of seven equations and an 
estimation of the logarithmic function indicate flattening (concavity) of the function 
describing the dependences between the sum involved in a crime and the penalty for that 
crime (Graph 1). The maximum penalty for the crime in question is 8 years, which a priori 
conditions the non-linearity; however, non-linearity in the created model is of a completely 
different nature, because the issued penalties are considerably lower than the maximum one. 
From a certain sum, the slope of the function decreases almost to zero, and the average 
sentence of the Regional Court for fraud in excess of the threshold value θ is in almost each 
case in the interval between 2 and 2.5 years of prison. As part of a robustness check, also 
changes to the length of sentences issued by the Court of Appeal are included. After taking 
into account the commutation of verdicts, the slope decreases even further.  
The presence of non-linearity is confirmed by a comparison of residuals of the model with 
the sum involved in a crime as an independent variable and residuals of the model with only 
control variables. Graph 2 presents a comparison between residuals of two models. Many 
points are located considerably far from the dotted line representing the lack of differences 
between residuals of the two models. Kernel-weighted local polynomial smoothing 
additionally demonstrates that the estimated function does not run in accordance with the 
dotted line representing the lack of differences between the residuals.  
 
Figure 1. Dependence between imprisonment 
penalty and the sum involved in a crime 
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Note: The graph presents theoretical values of models with various 
threshold values depending on the sum involved in a crime (crimei 
variable). In the case of control variables, their average values 
have been applied. 
Figure 2. Non-linearity between residuals of the 
model with and without the sum involved in a 
crime 
 
Source: own calculations 
 
 
The length of a prison sentence for fraud is also affected by the sex of the convict and 
the sex of the judge — convicted women receive shorter sentences, and female judges issue 
more lenient verdicts. This confirms the conclusions from above-mentioned studies of Riger 
et al. (1995), Steffensmeier, Demuth (2006), Boyd et al. (2010). It is worth noting that judges 
in Poland are assigned to cases by drawing lots. Thus, the gender bias is not caused by a 
method of assigning judges to certain cases. However, one possible hypothesis is the 
existence of the latent variable, namely the attenuating circumstances (for example, women 
may plead guilty or try to repair damage more frequently than men do). The second 
possibility is that defendants may adjust their strategy depending on the judge’s gender. 
Nonetheless, the precise reason for the gender bias is very hard to be investigated on the basis 
of quantitative method alone. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
An analysis of the effect of the sum of fraud on the length of the penalty for that fraud 
allows a better understanding of white-collar crimes. A strong dependence between the length 
of a prison sentence and the sum involved has been demonstrated. The effect of the above-
mentioned non-linearity is that repeating offences involving increasingly higher sums of 
money has no effect on the severity of the penalty. Since the penalty for a crime increases 
only slightly, potential white-collar criminals may feel stronger incentives to commit crimes 
involving higher sums of money. Such conclusions seem to be in line with the Polish folklore 
proverb "when stealing, go for millions," (which has a similar meaning to "go big or go 
home") because frauds involving higher sums are relatively more beneficial for the offender 
from the point of view of the severity of penalty for such crime.  
Such a dependency decreases the effectiveness of country criminal policy because, as 
the economic law analysis states, low punishments (low cost of committing a fraud) go in pair 
with a higher supply of crimes. Mentioned nonlinear dependency between the custodial 
sentence and the damage caused by a given white-collar crime may be even more dangerous 
because not only it creates incentives for criminal activity, but also it encourages committing 
bigger frauds. 
Furthermore, benefits from frauds are increased by mismanaged bailiff executions. 
The law states that the offender has to pay for the caused damage, but in reality it is not a 
case. The striking share of defendants have no wealth and income, so enforcement officers 
have no way to get the money back. In other words, the effective concealment of stolen assets 
increases the benefits of a crime, even if a custodial sentence is executed. The study has been 
conducted based on data from a Polish court, and the demonstration of a similar dependence 
and external validity in other countries would require further studies. However, the lack of an 
increasing rate of prison sentences for white-collar crimes committed for increasingly larger 
sums may be one of the reasons of supply of white-collar crimes also in other countries.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Variables Average Min
First 
quartile
Median
Third 
quartiles
Max
Years of imprisonment (Regional 
Court sentence)
1,933 0,000 1,500 1,667 2,000 7,000
Years of imprisonment (Court of 
Appeal)
1,848 0,000 1,417 1,667 2,000 7,000
Years of suspended imprisonment 
(Regional Court sentence)
3,329 0,000 2,000 3,000 5,000 7,000
Sum of money involed in a crime      
(in millions PLN)
4,210 0,050 0,274 0,551 2,153 178,302
Sum of money involed in a crime 
above 0.5 m. (in millions PLN)
3,814 0,000 0,000 0,051 1,653 177,802
Sum of money involed in a crime 
above 1.0 m. (in millions PLN)
3,593 0,000 0,000 0,000 1,153 177,302
Sum of money involed in a crime 
above 1.5 m. (in millions PLN)
3,430 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,653 176,802
Sum of money involed in a crime 
above 3.0 m.(in millions PLN)
3,085 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 175,302
Number of commited frauds 6,477 1,0 1,0 1,0 2,0 155,0
Age of the convict 40,187 18,0 31,0 40,0 48,0 65,0
Female convict (n=28) 0,262 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,0 1,0
Female convict, female judge (n=15) 0,140 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,0
Male convict, female judge (n=38) 0,355 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,0 1,0
Female convict, male judge (n=13) 0,121 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,0
Male convict, male judge (n=41) 0,383 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,0 1,0
Public defender (n=36) 0,336 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,0 1,0
Repeat offending (n=9) 0,084 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,0
Member of the organised criminal 
group (n=11)
0,103 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,0
Detectability of fraudsters (in per 87,335 74,300 87,300 88,400 89,500 90,500
Crime rate per capita 0,003 0,001 0,002 0,003 0,004 0,005
Table 2. OLS estimation results 
Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error
Sum of money involed in a crime 0,0133** 0,0067 1,9714** 0,8769 1,0364*** 0,3294 0,6369*** 0,2090 0,2540** 0,1106 0,8959** 0,3503 0,6304** 0,2668 0,0323 0,4334
Sum of money involed in a crime above 0.5 m. - - -1,9610** 0,8783 - - - - - - - - - - - -
Sum of money involed in a crime above 1.0 m. - - - - -1,0281*** 0,3310 - - - - -0,8899** 0,3521 -0,6208** 0,2680 -0,0275 0,4355
Sum of money involed in a crime above 1.5 m. - - - - - - -0,6286*** 0,2106 - - - - - - - -
Sum of money involed in a crime above 3.0 m. - - - - - - - - -0,2457*** 0,1127 - - - - - -
Number of commited frauds 0,0242*** 0,0059 0,0248*** 0,0058 0,0246*** 0,0057 0,0253*** 0,0057 0,0250 0,0058 0,0242*** 0,0065 0,0268*** 0,0046 0,0187** 0,0074
Age of the convict -0,0031 0,0106 -0,0064 0,0105 -0,0078 0,0103 -0,0069 0,0103 -0,0049 0,0105 -0,0092 0,0107 0,0037 0,0083 0,0026 0,0135
Public defender -0,3000 0,2586 -0,2740 0,2536 -0,2442 0,2482 -0,2872 0,2485 -0,3077 0,2537 -0,3861 0,2554 -0,2932 0,2010 -0,5905* 0,3266
Skazany(a) jest recydywistą -0,2134 0,4160 -0,3005 0,4094 -0,4031 0,4029 -0,4065 0,4049 -0,3924 0,4162 -0,5419 0,4438 -0,1844 0,3262 -1,3061** 0,5301
Member of the organised criminal group -0,4612 0,4931 -0,3748 0,4846 -0,2726 0,4760 -0,3480 0,4753 -0,3458 0,4865 0,0784 0,6111 -0,2031 0,3854 -0,6000 0,6262
Detectability of fraudsters (in per cent) -0,0075 0,0404 -0,0051 0,0396 -0,0157 0,0388 -0,0173 0,0390 -0,0156 0,0398 -0,0206 0,0390 0,0076 0,0314 -0,0212 0,0510
Crime rate per capita 124,93 136,78 170,52 135,55 149,38 131,19 137,41 131,49 125,36 134,16 64,67 140,05 142,43 106,23 -57,75 172,60
Female convict, female judge -0,9977*** 0,3560 -0,8884** 0,3522 -0,9015*** 0,3422 -0,9724*** 0,3421 -0,9913*** 0,3492 -0,8519** 0,3553 -0,5111* 0,2771 -0,8073* 0,4502
Male convict, female judge -0,5875** 0,2770 -0,4447 0,2788 -0,5261* 0,2659 -0,6145** 0,2663 -0,6559** 0,2735 -0,4870* 0,2864 -0,5434** 0,2153 -0,7192** 0,3498
Female convict, male judge -0,9781*** 0,3671 -0,9231** 0,3605 -0,9298*** 0,3518 -0,9807*** 0,3527 -0,9953*** 0,3602 -1,0434*** 0,3686 -0,4842* 0,2849 -0,6154 0,4629
2012 - - - - - - - - - - -0,9261** 0,4655 - - - -
2013 - - - - - - - - - - -0,9365** 0,4588 - - - -
2014 - - - - - - - - - - -0,6277 0,4355 - - - -
2015 - - - - - - - - - - -0,5297 0,4267 - - - -
2016 - - - - - - - - - - -1,2101** 0,5702 - - - -
Constant 2,7614 3,8269 1,6927 3,7795 2,9076 3,6641 3,2614 3,6808 3,3084 3,7620 4,4486 3,6948 0,4692 2,9671 5,9075 4,8208
Number of observations (n)
R-squared
Wald test (p-value)
Test (sum of money + interaction variable = 0) 
(p-value)
RESET test (p-value) 0,7510 0,24230,8129 0,6405 0,4795 0,3615 0,7635 0,0207
0,0000 0,1191
- 0,1357 0,2125 0,2162 0,2301 0,4113 0,0741 0,5857
0,0003 0,0001 0,0000 0,0000 0,0001 0,0001
107 107
0,2909 0,3266 0,3569 0,3523 0,3250 0,4020 0,4106 0,1655
107 107 107 107 107 107
Independent variables
Dependent variable
Years of 
imprisonment 
(Regional Court 
sentence)
Years of 
imprisonment 
(Regional Court 
sentence)
Years of 
imprisonment 
(Regional Court 
sentence)
Years of 
imprisonment 
(Regional Court 
sentence)
Years of 
imprisonment 
(Regional Court 
sentence)
Years of 
imprisonment 
(Regional Court 
sentence)
Years of 
imprisonment (Court 
of Appeal sentence)
Years of suspended 
imprisonment
 
Source: own calculations 
